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ABSTRACT:
This paper provides an analytical overview of how economic
development may be promoted or hindered by an effective system of
intellectual property rights (IPRS). IPRS can play a positive role in
encouraging new business development, rationalization of inefficient
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industry, and inducing technology acquisition and creation. They may
harm development prospects by raising the costs of imitation and permitting
monopolistic behavior by owners of IPRS. The potential gains and losses
depend on the competitive structure of markets and the efficiency of related
business regulation, including aspects of competition policy and technology
development policy. The paper reviews available empirical evidence on
these issues. The evidence supports the view that product innovation is
sensitive to IPRS in developing countries, while FDI and technology
transfer go up when patent rights are strengthened. Overall, there is a
positive impact on growth, but this impact depends on the competitive
nature of the economy. The paper concludes by putting forward
suggestions for integrated policy reforms.
INTRODUCTION
The question of how intellectual property rights (IPRS) affect the
processes of economic development and growth is complex and based on
multiple variables. The effectiveness of IPRS in this regard depends
considerably on particular circumstances in each country. While
economists are devoting more attention to this issue, evidence to date is
fragmented and somewhat contradictory, in part because many of the
concepts involved are not readily measured. As I discuss below, stronger
systems for protecting intellectual property could either enhance or limit
economic growth, in theory. Nevertheless, evidence is emerging that
stronger and more certain IPRS could well increase economic growth and
foster beneficial technical change, thereby improving development
prospects, if they are structured in a manner that promotes effective and
dynamic competition.'
As the global protection regime strengthens due to implementation of
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS), concluded under auspices of the World Trade Organization,
numerous questions arise about impacts on prospects for economic growth.
For many reasons, it is impossible to claim confidently that the new regime
will raise growth and improve economic development processes. Two such
reasons are paramount. First, many other variables affect growth in ways
that could dominate the impacts of IPRS. Such elements include
macroeconomic stability, market openness, policies for improving the
1 See Robert E. Evenson & Larry E. Westphal, Technological Change and
Technology Strategy, in 3A HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIcS 2209, 2229-30
(Jere Behrman & T.N. Srinivasan eds. 1995); Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual
Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, 9
DuKE J. COMP & INT'L L. 109, 128-38, 149 (1998) [hereinafter Maskus, Foreign Direct
Investment]; Carlos A. Primo Braga et al., Intellectual Property Rights and Economic
Development (1998) (unpublished manuscript, Background Paper for the World
Development Report, on file with the author).
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economy's technological infrastructure, and the acquisition of human
capital. Second, economic theory points out that IPRS could have many
effects on growth, some positive and some negative. Further, the
significance of these effects would be dependent on circumstances in each
country. However, in a broad setting of appropriate complementary policies
and transparent regulation, IPRS could play an important and positive role
in promoting economic growth. Indeed, the system of IPRS itself may be
structured in particular ways to favor dynamic competition within a system
of rights and obligations.
With this background, the paper addresses two broad issues. In
Section Two, I discuss theory and evidence regarding how IPRS may
improve or retard economic development. The primary finding is that
development is a complex process and that IPRS could have a range of
impacts. The policy approach most conducive to expanding development is
to implement an integrated system of both IPRS and corollary policies that
strike a balance of incentives in favor of rigorous but fair dynamic
competition. Thus, in Section Three, I overview these broader policy
initiatives, suggesting methods by which developing countries might wish
to complement their emerging IPRS regimes. Section Four provides
concluding remarks.
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EcoNoMIc DEVELOPMENT
Before considering how IPRS influence economic activity and growth,
consider their intended roles in the economy. Economic analysis of IPRS is
utilitarian, asking whether the benefits of any system outweigh its costs,
both in static and dynamic terms. The anticipated benefits and costs depend
on characteristics of markets, products, and social institutions. Thus, a "one
size fits all" approach to harmonizing international IPRS makes little
economic sense.
A. The Purposes and Mechanisms of Intellectual Property Rights
There are two central economic objectives of any system of
intellectual property protection. The first is to promote investments in
knowledge creation and business innovation by establishing exclusive
rights to use and sell newly developed technologies, goods, and services.
Absent such rights, economically valuable information could be
appropriated without compensation by competitive rivals. Firms would be
less willing to incur the costs of investing in research and
commercialization activities. In economic terms, weak IPRS create a
negative dynamic externality. They fail to overcome the problems of
uncertainty in R&D and risks in competitive appropriation that are inherent
in private markets for information.
The second goal is to promote widespread dissemination of new
knowledge by encouraging (or requiring) rights holders to place their
20001
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inventions and ideas on the market. Information is a form of public good in
that it is inherently non-rival and, moreover, developers may find it difficult
to exclude others from using it. In economic terms it is socially efficient to
provide wide access to new technologies and products, once they are
developed, at marginal production costs. Such costs could be quite low for
they may entail simply copying a blueprint or making another copy of a
compact disk or video.
There is a fundamental tradeoff between these objectives. An overly
protective system of IPRS could limit the social gains from invention by
reducing incentives to disseminate its fruits. However, an excessively weak
system could reduce innovation by failing to provide an adequate return on
investment. Thus, a policy balance needs to be found that is appropriate to
market conditions and conducive to growth.
Different forms of IPRS operate in distinct fashions and it is
misleading to group them together. Therefore, it is helpful to mention
briefly what the various mechanisms are. First, patents provide the right to
prevent for 20 years the unauthorized making, selling, importing, or using
of a product or technology that is recognized in the patent claim and that
must demonstrate novelty and industrial utility. Related devices are utility
models, or petty patents, which provide exclusive rights for a shorter period
for incremental inventions, and industrial designs. In most countries patent
applications are made public after a prescribed time period. Thus, patents
establish a protected market advantage in return for revealing technical
knowledge. Several aspects of patent scope affect the effective strength of
protection. A similar type of industrial property is plant breeders' rights,
which have fixed terms, novelty requirements, and disclosure rules. They
are intended to encourage development and use of new seed varieties for
agriculture.
Trademarks protect rights to market goods and services under
identified names and symbols. Trademarks and brand names must be
sufficiently unique to avoid confusing consumers, thereby playing the
important role of reducing consumer search costs. These rights encourage
firms to invest in name recognition and product quality. They also induce
licensees to protect the value of assets by selling goods of guaranteed
quality levels. If trademarks were not protected, rival firms could pass off
their lower-quality goods as legitimate versions of those produced by
recognized companies. This situation would diminish incentives for
maintaining quality and would raise consumer search costs. Economists
generally believe that the danger of market dominance through abuse of
trademarks is slight in competitive economies but such marks could be
accompanied by significant market power in countries with other barriers to
entry.
Firms develop some technologies that might not be patentable, might
not be worth the cost of applying for a patent, or might be more valuable if
kept undisclosed. They prefer to keep knowledge of such processes
[Vol. 32:471
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proprietary as trade secrets, or undisclosed information. Trade secrets are
protected by legal rules against learning by rivals through dishonest means.
Such protection lapses if the technologies are discovered by fair means,
such as independent invention or reverse engineering. Protecting trade
secrets is beneficial to the extent it encourages the development and
commercial use of sub-patentable inventions. Rules protecting trade secrets
thus promote adaptive innovation and encourage learning through legal
means.
Literary and artistic creations and computer software are protected by
copyrights, which provide exclusive rights for some period to copy and sell
particular expressions of ideas after they are fixed in some medium.
Related IPRS include neighboring rights of performers and broadcasters,
moral rights of original artists, and copyrights for derivative products. Like
patents, copyrights are limited in scope for various purposes of public
policy. The most significant limitation is the fair-use doctrine, under which
it is lawful to make limited numbers of copies for research and educational
purposes.
Several technologies do not fit comfortably into these traditional
categories of protection. Because computer programs may contain
elements of industrial utility in addition to their expressive elements, some
countries make programs eligible for patents. The designs of integrated
circuits typically are awarded exclusive rights for shorter time periods than
patents, recognizing that semiconductor designs often embody elements of
expression and that technology changes quickly in that industry. Electronic
transmissions of internet materials, broadcasts, and databases may not be
adequately protected by standard copyrights and two recent treaties reached
in the World Intellectual Property Organization call for stronger protection
in certain dimensions.2
Particularly controversial, especially in developing nations, are patents
for biotechnological inventions and plant breeders' rights. It could be
argued that patents generate strong and unwarranted protection in the
biotechnology industry, because such inventions may not embody a truly
inventive step. However, representatives of biotechnology firms claim that
patents are required to encourage investment in these risky technologies.
There are significant concerns that providing exclusive rights in seed
varieties without significant limitations for farmers' use and competitive
research could raise costs in agriculture and reduce biodiversity over time.
2 See MARC BACCHETrA, WORLD TRADE ORG., ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND THE
ROLE OF THE WTO 61-62 (1998) (stating that two new treaties, the WIPO Copyright
Treaty and the WIPO Performances & Phonograms Treaty, will afford increased
"protection of authors', performers' and phonogram producers' rights . . . of
communication, circumvention of technological measures and integrity of rights
management information" relating to the Internet).
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A final element of an intellectual property system is its enforcement.
Such enforcement entails two opposing tasks: punishing infringement by
free riders and disciplining enterprises that try to extend their rights beyond
intended levels by acting in an anti-competitive manner. These objectives
require the development of extensive legal and scientific expertise.
B. Endogenous IPRS
A first analytical point to recognize is that national regimes of
intellectual property protection strongly depend on the level of economic
development. Thus, the causation between IPRS and development operates
in both directions. Indeed, that governments strengthen their IPRS systems
as their economies become wealthier and attain a deeper basis of
technological sophistication is well established. The claim that strong IPRS
promote technical change and development is more debatable.
The determinants of intellectual property protection have been the
subject of empirical investigation. For example, consider the index of
patent rights developed by Ginarte and Park.3 They studied the patent laws
of a comprehensive set of countries every fifth year from 1960 to 1990,
considering five components of the laws: duration of protection, extent of
coverage, membership in international patent agreements, provisions for
loss of protection, and enforcement measures. Each of these components
was broken down into characteristics determining its effective strength. For
example, patent coverage incorporated the eligibility for patents of
pharmaceutical and chemical products and the availability of utility models.
Enforcement measures included the availability of preliminary injunctions,
contributory infringement actions, and reversal of the burden of proof in
process patent cases. These classifications were based solely on the laws as
written; the authors could not assess how stringently the laws were actually
enforced. Each sub-component was assigned a value of one if present and
zero if absent, with the component score being the sum of these values as a
percentage of the maximum value. Thus, the minimum possible national
score was 0.0 and the maximum was 5.0.
To illustrate the index, across all countries in 1985 it averaged 2.44,
indicating that roughly half the various sub-components in patent rights
existed in the average nation.4 The developed economies had indexes that
were both considerably higher and less variable than those of the middle-
income and low-income developing economies. The increase in average
protection from poor countries to middle-income countries was
considerably less than that from middle-income countries to rich countries.
Over time, there was a marked increase in the average index across nations.
However, there was not much evidence of convergence between developing
3 See Juan C. Ginarte & Walter G. Park, Determinants of Patent Rights: A Cross-
National Study, 26 RES. POL'Y 283, 285-86 (1997).
4 See id. at 286.
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and developed countries until the 1990s, as shown in a follow-up study by
Park and Ginarte from 1997.5
Ginarte and Park undertook an econometric study of the empirical
determinants of their index. 6 They found that the strength of patent rights
across countries and over time depended positively on real GDP per capita,
the share of R&D in GDP, openness to international trade, and a measure of
the freedom of markets from arbitrary and non-transparent government
regulation. Human capital, measured by the secondary school enrollment
ratio in an earlier period, was a positive and marginally significant
contributor to patent rights. Their results therefore suggest that the
development of patent rights responds to rising demands for protection,
because countries with higher R&D intensities and human capital inputs
have higher indexes. The positive effect of trade openness is intriguing
though subject to various interpretations. It could be that people are willing
to provide stronger protection in open economies because IPRS help
preserve access to greater consumer choice. It could also be that in open
economies international trade interacts positively with innovative effort,
raising the demand for intellectual property protection.
I extended this work through an extensive regression analysis of the
determinants of the patent index in 1985 and 1990 for 72 countries. The
results were largely consistent but my specification discovered two
additional features. First, market size (aggregate GDP) had no significant
impact on patent rights. This finding is potentially important for
understanding policy evolution. It suggests that an economy's absolute size
itself is not a strong determinant of IPRS reform, in contrast with per-capita
income and economic development. Because U.S. trade authorities are
concerned with the strength of IPRS protection in large but poor economies,
such as India and China, they have mounted considerable pressure for
change. This finding suggests that, despite such pressure, effective patent
rights may remain limited until incomes grow beyond current levels.
Second, controlling for other influences, there is an inverted-U
relationship between patent strength and real per-capita income. In other
words, the apparent strength of patent rights first falls as incomes rise above
their lowest levels. After reaching a minimum at some intermediate income
level, patent laws are strengthened as development proceeds. Indeed, the
strength of patents seems to accelerate at high income levels. The
computations suggested that the per capita real income at which patent
protection becomes weakest is approximately $2,000 in 1985 international
5 Cf. id., at 291 (stating that over thirty years, the average index increased by
15.5%).
6 See id. at 293-99.
7 See KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY,
tbl. 4.7 (2000).
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dollars. 8 Moreover, the patent index consistent with the regression is the
same for economies with percapita GDP of $500 and $7750.9 It follows
that there is a significant range of incomes before protection becomes
stronger than its levels in the poorest countries.
These findings may be explained by the nature of technological
development. Least-developed countries devote virtually no resources to
innovation and have little intellectual property to protect. As incomes and
technical capabilities grow to intermediate levels, some adaptive innovation
emerges but competition flows primarily from imitation. Thus, the majority
of economic and political interests at this stage prefer weak protection. As
economies mature to higher levels of technological capacity and demands
shift toward higher-quality products, domestic firms come to favor
protective IPRS. Finally, the strength of IPRS shifts up sharply at the
highest income levels as these latter processes are cemented.l°
Not only do legislated IPRS become stronger as economies develop,
but enforcement and compliance also rise with income levels. Weak
enforcement in developing nations reflects both an unwillingness to pay the
high costs of administering an effective IPRS system and an inability to
manage the complex legal and technical issues such a system entails.
C. Positive Impacts of IPRS on Economic Development
Consider now the opposite direction of causation. Economists
recognize several channels through which IPRS could stimulate economic
development and growth. These processes are interdependent and it is
appropriate to adopt a comprehensive view of the incentives associated with
intellectual property protection.
Intellectual property rights could play a significant role in encouraging
innovation, product development, and technical change. Developing
countries tend to have IPRS systems that favor information diffusion
through low-cost imitation of foreign products and technologies. This
policy stance suggests that prospects for domestic invention and innovation
are insufficiently developed to warrant protection. However, inadequate
IPRS could stifle technical change even at low levels of economic
development. This is because much invention and product innovation are
aimed at local markets and could benefit from domestic protection of
patents, utility models, and trade secrets. In the vast majority of cases,
8 See id, at ch. 4.2.
9 See id.
10 See Evenson & Westphal, supra note 1, at 2244-45; cf Sumner J. Lacroix, The
Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights in Developing Countries, in THE
ECONOMICS OF COOPERATION: EAST ASIAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE CASE FOR PRO-
MARKET INTERVENTION 79, 84 (James A. Woumasset & Susan Barr eds. 1992)
(discussing the incentives for countries who are net technology importers to maintain
weak IPR systems).
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invention involves minor adaptations of existing technologies and products.
The cumulative impacts of these small inventions can be critical for growth
in knowledge and productive activity. To become competitive, enterprises
in developing countries typically must adopt new management and
organizational systems and techniques for quality control, which can
markedly raise productivity. Such investments are costly but tend to have
high social returns because they are crucial for raising productivity toward
global norms." They are more likely to be undertaken in an environment
where risks of unfair competition and trademark infringement are small.
Moreover, IPRS could help reward creativity and risk-taking among new
enterprises and entrepreneurs. Countries that retain weak standards could
remain dependent on dynamically inefficient firms that rely on
counterfeiting and imitation.
An example of this process is that protection for utility models has
been shown to improve productivity in countries with lagging technologies.
In Brazil, utility models helped domestic producers gain a significant share
of the farm-machinery market byT encouraging adaptation of foreign
technologies to local conditions.' Utility models in the Philippines
encouraged successful adaptive invention of rice threshers.1
3
Maskus and McDaniel (1999) considered how the Japanese patent
system (JPS) affected postwar Japanese technical progress, as measured by
increases in total factor productivity (TFP).14 The JPS in place over the
estimation period 1960-1993 evidently was designed to encourage
incremental and adaptive innovation and diffusion of technical knowledge
into the economy. Mechanisms for promoting these processes included
early disclosure of, and opposition proceedings to, patent applications, an
extensive system of utility models, and narrow claim requirements in patent
applications. The authors found that this system encouraged large numbers
of utility model applications for incremental inventions, which were based
in part on laid-open prior applications for invention patents. In turn, utility
models had a strongly positive impact on real TFP growth over the period,
while patent applications had a weaker but still positive effect. They
concluded that utility models were an important source of technical change
and information diffusion in Japan, while patent applications provided both
a direct and an indirect stimulus to productivity. It is interesting to note that
as Japan has become a global leader in technology creation, its patent
" See Evenson & Westphal, supra note 1, at 2249-50.
12 See id. at 2257 (citing S. Dahab, Technological Change in the Brazilian
Agricultural Implements Industry (1986) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale
University)).
13 See id. at 2261 (citing K.W. Mikkelsen, Inventive Activity in Philippine Industry
(1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University)).
14 See Keith E. Maskus & Christine McDaniel, Impacts of the Japanese Patent System
on Productivity Growth, 11 JAPAN & WORLD ECON. 557 (1999).
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system has shifted away from encouraging diffusion and more toward
protecting fundamental technologies.
Recent studies suggest that innovation through product development
and entry of new firms is motivated in part by trademark protection, even in
poor nations. A survey of trademark use in Lebanon provided evidence on
this point.15 Lebanon has an extensive set of intellectual property laws but
they are weakly enforced. 16 Firms in the apparel industry claimed to have a
strong interest in designing apparel of high quality and style aimed at
Middle Eastern markets. Such efforts have been frustrated by trademark
infringement in Lebanon and in neighboring countries. This problem was
yet larger in the food products sector, where legitimate firms suffered from
rivals passing off goods under their trademarks. The problem has seriously
hampered attempts to build markets for Lebanese foods in the Middle East
and elsewhere. Related difficulties plagued innovative producers in the
cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, and metal products sectors. Thus, local
product development and establishment of new firms have been stifled by
trademark infringement targeted largely at domestic enterprises.
Similar problems exist in China, as found in a second survey. 17 While
the information was anecdotal, it suggested that trademark infringement
negatively affected innovative Chinese enterprises. Many examples were
cited of difficulties facing Chinese producers of consumer goods, such as
soft drinks, processed foods, and clothing. The establishment of brand
recognition in China requires costly investments in marketing and
distribution channels. Enterprises that achieved this status quickly found
their trademarks applied to counterfeit products. Such products were of
lower quality and damaged the reputation of the legitimate enterprise.
Furthermore, this problem was difficult to overcome and, in some cases,
forced enterprises to close down or abandon their trademarks. According to
survey respondents, this situation had a deterrent effect on enterprise
development and effectively prevented interregional marketing. In turn,
enterprises were less able to achieve economies of scale. Chinese
trademark infringement was concentrated on products with low capital
requirements and high labor intensity. These are sectors in which China
has strong comparative advantages. On this evidence, the authors
concluded that trademark violations may be particularly damaging to
enterprise development in poor nations.
15 See Keith E. Maskus, Strengthening Intellectual Property Rights in Lebanon, in
CATCHING UP WITH THE COMPETITION (Bernard Hoekman & Jamel E. Zarrouk,k eds.,
forthcoming 2000) [hereinafter Maskus, Strengthening Intellectual Property Rights in
Lebanon].
16 See id.
17 See Keith E. Maskus et al., Intellectual Property Rights and Economic
Development in China (July 29, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author)
[hereinafter China Survey].
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Similar comments apply to copyrights. Copyright industries, such as
publishing, entertainment, and software, are likely to be dominated by
foreign enterprises (which can absorb temporary losses and afford the costs
of deterring infringement) and pirate firms in countries with weak
protection and enforcement. Thus, lower-quality copies would be widely
available but the economy's domestic cultural and technological
development would be hampered. This situation was clear in the Lebanese
survey. 18 Lebanon has a small but vibrant film and television industry that
could successfully export to neighboring economies if those countries
engineered stronger copyright protection. In China, the domestic software
industry has grown rapidly in the area of particular business applications,
which did not suffer extensive unauthorized copying, but has faced
obstacles in developing larger and more fundamental programs. Thus,
domestic commercial interests in stronger copyrights have emerged and are
now playing a role in promoting enforcement.
Intellectual property rights also could stimulate acquisition and
dissemination of new information. Patent claims are published, allowing
rival firms to use the information in them to develop further inventions.
This learning process takes place in 10 to 12 months in the United States. 19
Knowledge formation is cumulative and as new inventions build on past
practices the process of technical change could accelerate. 0 Patents,
trademarks, and trade secrets also afford firms greater certainty that they
face limited threats of uncompensated appropriation. This certainty could
induce them to trade and license their technologies and products more
readily, enhancing their diffusion into the economy.
In strengthening their IPRS regimes, either unilaterally or through
adherence to TRIPS, developing countries hope to attract greater inflows of
technology. There are three interdependent channels through which
technology is transferred across borders. These channels are international
trade in goods, foreign direct investment (FDI) within multinational
enterprises, and contractual licensing of technologies and trademarks to
unaffiliated firms, subsidiaries, and joint ventures. Economic theory finds
that technology transfers through each channel depend in part on local
protection of IPRS, albeit in complex and subtle ways.
It is widely recognized by economists that imports of goods and
services could transfer and diffuse technology. Imports of capital goods
and technical inputs could directly reduce production costs and raise
productivity. The extent of this benefit would depend on the technological
18 See Maskus, Strengthening Intellectual Property Rights in Lebanon, supra note 15.
19 See Edwin Mansfield, How Rapidly Does New Industrial Technology Leak Out?,
34 J. INDUS. ECON. 217, 219-21 (1985).
20 See Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative
Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 29, 31 (1991).
21 See Maskus, Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 1, at 109-52.
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content of imports, suggesting that close trade linkages with innovative
developed economies could engender considerable productivity gains
through trade flows. For example, Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (1997)
found that a one-percent increase in imports of machinery and equipment
from OECD countries tended to raise total factor productivity in developing
countries by around 0.03% on average.22
Thus, an important question is whether IPRS affect such trade flows.
Maskus and Penubarti (1995) pointed out that variable IPRs across
countries could influence imports in a number of ways. 23 The essential
trade-off from strengthening patents would be between a contraction of
trade as protected firms exercise stronger market power and an expansion
of trade because such firms would experience higher demand for their
products.
Thus, the issue is empirical and it is worthwhile to present key results
here. The second and third columns of results in Table 1 report calculations
of changes in imports that could be induced by stronger patent rights,
updated from a general-equilibrium trade model estimated by Maskus and
Penubarti. 24 The calculations in column two are for total manufacturing
imports. These figures apply elasticities of imports with respect to patent
rights, computed from an econometric analysis of bilateral 1984 trade data,
to 1995 import volumes. The patent index used was a version of that
developed by Rapp and Rozek (1990). 25  This index was increased in
various amounts for different countries, reflecting rough estimates of the
extent of commitments in patent laws required by TRIPS.
The anticipated impacts on trade volume depend on the extent of
patent revisions, market size, and the degree of the imitation threat that
would be relaxed by adherence to TRIPS. Estimated effects on trade range
from small impacts in the United States and Switzerland, which are not
required to undertake much legal revision, to substantial increases in
imports in China, Thailand, Indonesia, and Mexico, which must adopt
22 See David J. Coe et al., North-South R&D Spillovers, 107 ECON. J. 134, 147
(1997).
23 See Keith E. Maskus & Mohan Penubarti, How Trade-Related Are Intellectual
Property Rights?, 39 J. INT'L EcON. 227, 241 (1995).
24 See infra Table 1, available in Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Issues for
the New Round, in THE WTO AFrER SEATTLE (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., forthcoming 2000)
[hereinafter Maskus, New Round].
2 See generally Richard T. Rapp & Richard P. Rozek, Benefits and Costs of
Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries, 3 NERA WORKING PAPER
SERIES (1990) (illustrating the benefits to developing countries from intellectual property
protection, such as economic and technological development, more competition, and
lower prices for consumers).
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stronger rights.26 In the case of Mexico, it updated its IPRS regime in an
accelerated fashion because of commitments made under NAFTA.27 The
result here suggests that a substantial component of its increase in
manufacturing imports in the 1990s may be attributed, other things equal, to
stronger patent protection. It is interesting that many of the largest
predicted impacts are in nations with strong imitation capacities, such as
Argentina and Brazil. In contrast, India and Bangladesh would experience
relatively weak, though positive, trade impacts.
28
The third column reports similar computations for imports of high-
technology manufactures, defined as pharmaceuticals, electrical machinery,
and professional instruments. The sectoral regression estimates in the
original study implied that stronger patent rights in developed economies
would actually reduce such trade because of a market-power effect and a
diversion of trade to developing countries. The latter nations had strongly
positive import elasticities in these goods.
Overall, the trade volume impacts estimated here are significant for
developing economies that undertake extensive patent revisions. For
example, the anticipated increase in manufactured imports for Mexico of
$5.7 billion amounts to 9.4% of its manufactured imports in 1995.29 It is
important to note that this impact would take years to emerge because the
patent obligations are to be phased in over time. In that context, even if the
trade impacts are overestimated the evidence suggests the long-run impacts
could be substantial. The estimated increase in China's high-technology
imports of $2.6 billion amounts to just under two percent of its imports in
1995.30 Applying the result from Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (1997),
this finding suggests that the stronger patents required by TRIPS could raise
Chinese TFP by perhaps 0.6 percentage points per year. This would
represent a significant bonus to productivity performance.
The second main channel of technology transfer is FDI. Such
investment exists because firms with ownership advantages employ them
through internal organization of multinational activity, with the location of
production depending on local market characteristics. Thus, IPRS should
26 China has largely met TRIPS requirements in its legislation in anticipation of
joining the WTO. Cf. John J.P. Howley & Antonino B. Roman, Assessing Enforcement
Status of Intellectual Property Rights in Asia, N.Y. L. J., Apr. 26, 1999, at S8 (discussing
the steps China has taken to protect and enforce intellectual property rights).
27 See North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA], Dec. 17, 1992, U.S. - Can.
- Mex., 32 I.L.M. 296 (1993).
2 Cf. Pamela J. Smith, Are Weak Patent Rights a Barrier to U.S. Exports?, 48 J.
INT'L ECON. 151 (1999) (providing empirical evidence that increased patent rights
protection in developing countries will lead to an increase in U.S. exports to that
country).
29 See infra Table 1; Maskus, New Round, supra note 24.
30 See infra Table 1; Maskus, New Round, supra note 24.
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have varying importance in different sectors with respect to encouraging
FDI. Investment in low-technology goods and services should depend
relatively less on the strength of IPRS and relatively more on input costs
and market opportunities. Investors with products or technologies that are
costly to imitate would pay little attention to local IPRS in their decision
making. Firms with easily copied products and technologies, such as
pharmaceuticals and software, would be quite concerned about the ability
of the local IPRS system to deter imitation. Firms considering investing in
a local R&D facility would pay particular attention to local patent and
trade-secrets protection.
This perspective was borne out by Mansfield (1994), who surveyed
100 U.S. firms with international operations in 1991.3 Intellectual property
executives in enterprises covering six industries were asked their views of
the importance of IPRS in their FDI and licensing decision and their
assessments of the adequacy of IPRS in 16 countries. Table 2 reproduces
his results regarding type of investment facility.32 In no industry was there
much concern about IPRS protecting the operation of sales and distribution
outlets. In the chemical industry, which includes pharmaceuticals, 46% of
firms were concerned about protection for basic production and assembly
facilities, 71% for components manufacture, 87% for complete products
manufacture, and 100% for R&D facilities.33 This tendency to be more
concerned with IPRS the higher the stage of production carried over to all
sectors. Overall, the chemical industry was the most affected in its
decisions to invest, while in all sectors there was a strong concern about
local IPRS in locating R&D operations. In a companion paper, Mansfield
(1995) demonstrated that these findings held also for Japanese and German
firms considering foreign investments.
Table 3 presents additional results for selected countries with weak
IPRS at the time of the survey. India engendered the greatest concern about
IPRS, as 80% of the chemical firms surveyed indicated they could not
engage in joint ventures or transfer new technologies to subsidiaries or
unrelated firms in that nation.35 Interestingly, in chemicals there was little
difference between joint ventures and subsidiaries in this regard. Both
investments evidently provided foreign firms with approximately the same
level of security about their technologies. However, across all countries
licensing to unrelated firms was seen as riskier in the face of weak IPRS.
31 See Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment,
and Technology Transfer, World Bank Discussion paper No. 19, at 1 (1994).
32 See id. at 1-3.
" See id. at 3.
34 See Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Investment,
and Technology Transfer: Germany, Japan, and the United States, World Bank
Discussion paper No. 27, at 2, 4, 22 (1995).
35 See id. at 5-6.
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This situation seemed to hold also in the machinery industry. In other
sectors, however, there was little difference in the willingness to transfer
technology through various channels according to weakness in intellectual
property rights.
The finding that licensing was viewed as insecure compared with FDI
in the high-technology sectors illustrates a subtle aspect of intellectual
property protection. In theory, firms are more likely to undertake FDI than
licensing when they own a complex technology, produce highly
differentiated products, and face high licensing costs. 3p Under these
circumstances, it is efficient to internalize the costs of technology transfer
through direct investment in a majority-owned subsidiary. As IPRS are
upgraded, licensing costs should fall because it becomes easier to discipline
licensees against revelation or misappropriation of proprietary technology
and against misuse of a trademark. Furthermore, international firms should
become more willing to develop vertically integrated relationships with
input suppliers and distribution networks.
From this analysis it is possible to conclude that the strength of IPRS
and the ability to enforce contracts should have important effects on
decisions by multinational firms on where to invest and whether to transfer
advanced technologies. Returning to Table 1, I report the results of
econometric estimation of a model of FDI and IPRS.37 The figures in
column four use coefficients developed in a four-equation simultaneous
decision framework, which incorporated the impacts of patent rights on
patent applications, affiliate sales, exports, and affiliate assets. The model
was estimated with data over 1986-1994 for the foreign operations of U.S.
majority-owned manufacturing affiliates in several developed and
developing countries. The assets equation had a negative coefficient on
patent rights, suggesting that on average across countries stronger patents
would diminish the local asset stock. However, there was a large positive
coefficient on patents interacted with an indicator variable for developing
countries, resulting in a net positive and significant impact in those nations.
This result likely means that at low protection levels internalization
decisions encourage FDI as patents get stronger. However, as protection
exceeds some level there emerges a substitution effect favoring licensing
over investment. In brief, there was a negative elasticity of FDI with
respect to patent rights in high-income economies but a strongly positive
elasticity among developing economies.
Applying these impacts to anticipated changes in patent rights
engineered by TRIPS generates the estimated impacts on asset stocks in
36 Cf. Ignatius Horstmann & James R. Markusen, Licensing Versus Direct
Investment: A Model of Internalization by the Multinational Enterprise, 20 CAN. J.
ECON. 464, 466 (1987) (discussing the fact that FDI is more cost-effective than licensing
where a firm can produce products of differing quality).
37 See Maskus, Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 1, at 153.
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Column 4.38 Reductions in asset stocks in Japan and Canada would amount
to over $2 billion each, though these impacts would be less than one percent
of 1994 U.S.-owned assets in those nations. However, FDI assets would
rise significantly in Brazil, Mexico, Thailand, and Indonesia as a result of
stronger patents. Indeed, the increase in the Mexican FDI asset stock would
be 2.6% of 1994 U.S.-owned assets in that country and that in Brazil would
be 7.4%. On this evidence, it seems that FDI decisions are highly
responsive to decisions to strengthen intellectual property rights.
Technology licensing was the subject of one recent study.39 The
figures in the fifth column of Table 1 update their results of estimating the
impacts of international variations in patent rights on the volume (in 1990
dollars) of unaffiliated royalties and licensing fees (a measure of arm's-
length technology transfer) paid to U.S. firms. They used the Ginarte-Park
index in a panel of 26 countries in 1985, 1990, and 1995. In their preferred
specification the patent index had a significant and positive impact on
licensing.4° The elasticity of licensing with respect to patent rights was
estimated to be 5.3, indicating a highly significant sensitivity of technology
trade to IPRs protection. Applying this elasticity to anticipated changes in
patent rights, using existing fees in 1995, generated the predicted changes
in volume in the final column. Japan had a large absolute response,
reflecting the importance of licensing in the Japanese economy. However,
large responses were also discovered in Korea, Mexico, Brazil, and
Indonesia. Indeed, the analysis suggested that licensing volumes in Mexico
and India would double and would go up by a factor of nearly five in
Indonesia.
The findings discussed here are predictions of long-run impacts of
patent reforms, as required by the TRIPS agreement, on imports, FDI, and
market-based technology transfer. The figures are not definitive and
additional analysis would be useful in refining the conclusions. However,
they are sufficiently robust to conclude that stronger IPRs could have
potentially significant and positive impacts on the transfer of technology to
developing countries through each of these channels. This result is
especially pertinent in middle-income developing countries with significant
38 See infra Table 1; Maskus, New Round, supra note 24.
39 See Guifang Yang & Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights and Licensing:
An Econometric Investigation (May 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file at the
University of Colorado, Boulder).
40 They also detected a positive impact on licensing of industrial processes and a
weaker but positive effect on affiliated royalties and licensing fees. See id. at section 2:
Intellectual Property in Licensing. It is impossible to disentangle the extent to which this
response entailed higher licensing charges on given technologies, higher-quality
technologies, or higher contract volumes. However, the response was so elastic that
there was a considerable amount of additional technology being transferred. See id. at
section 5: Estimation Results.
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imitative capabilities. The results are less striking for the least developed
economies, where the impacts would be positive but small.
There are important practical implications of this analysis. First,
countries with weak IPRS could be isolated from modem technologies and
would be forced to develop technological knowledge from their own
resources, a difficult and costly task. Second, those countries would obtain
fewer spillover benefits and demonstration effects of new technologies in
their economies. Third, technologies available to such nations would tend
to be outdated. Finally, nations with weak IPRS would experience both
limited incentives for domestic innovation and relatively few inward
technology transfers.
Recent survey evidence from China supported these arguments.4 '
When interviewed, managers of many foreign enterprises expressed
reluctance to locate R&D facilities in China, citing fear of misappropriation
and patent infringement. Nearly all reported that their enterprises
transferred technologies that were at least five years behind global
standards, unless other means could be found to protect them, or brought in
technologies that would be obsolete in a short time. Note that the
importation of lagging technologies is not necessarily inappropriate for
China's cost conditions and such knowledge could help encourage follow-
on innovation. However, as China moves toward best practices in
technology the problem could become more restraining. Moreover,
concerns about weak IPRS discouraged foreign enterprises from fully
integrating their Chinese operations. Instead they tended to divide
production processes among facilities in order to avoid revealing the full
nature of their technologies in any one location.
Indeed, IPRS should encourage the development of interregional and
international distribution and marketing networks that are critical for
achieving economies of scale. Weak IPRS could limit incentives for such
investments because rights owners would be unable to prevent their
marketing outlets from debasing the quality of their products, nor could
they readily deter counterfeiting of their trademarks. Thus, IPRS should
permit effective monitoring and enforcement of activities throughout supply
and distribution chains, providing both innovators and distributors an
incentive to invest in marketing, service, and quality guarantees.
Quality assurance is important for safeguarding the interests of
consumers. However, widespread distribution of counterfeit products can
ruin reputations achieved at considerable cost, a problem that can be
overcome only with additional investments. For example, in food products,
beverages, cosmetics, and medicines, counterfeit products can be hazardous
for consumers. Indeed, field research in China suggested that despite the
benefits to poor consumers of low-cost product knockoffs, they were
41 See China Survey, supra note 17, at 23-24.
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becoming resentful that market saturation by unauthorized goods
diminished the available range of legitimate goods.42
A further potential benefit of strengthened intellectual property
protection is that it could induce greater R&D aimed at meeting the
particular needs of developing countries. Inventive firms in developed
economies tend to orient their research programs toward products and
technologies for which they expect a large global demand and that may be
protected through IPRS and trade secrets. This means that a
disproportionately small amount of global R&D is focused on the needs of
developing economies with low incomes and weak IPRS. For example, the
World Health Organization (1996) claims that of the $56 billion spent
globally on medical R&D in 1994, only 0.2% was aimed at pneumonia,
diarrheal maladies, and tuberculosis, which together account for 18% of
global illness.43
It is possible that the new patent regimes introduced by TRIPS could
change this situation. The total market size for pharmaceuticals of the
countries that must upgrade their patent protection over the medium term is
sufficiently large that, even at current shares of drugs patented elsewhere,
the rise in demand could be as much as 25% of global spending.44 Thus,
the incentives generated for R&D focused on diseases of poor countries
could be significant. While this is a crude calculation, it suggests that
pharmaceutical firms could anticipate higher profits in developing nations,
some portion of which could be devoted to research on their endemic
diseases.
Nonetheless, there is considerable uncertainty about this outcome and
it is possible to doubt its practical significance. Even with stronger patents
(the enforcement of which would be problematic), the ability of
impoverished people to buy protected treatments would not rise much for a
long period of time. In this context, a strong argument for public promotion
and international procurement and distribution of new drugs may be
made.45
42 See id. at 18-19.
43 See AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON HEALTH RESEARCH RELATED TO FUTURE INTERVENTION
OPTIONS, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, INVESTING IN HEALTH RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT at xxiv, xxiv-xxv, xxviii (1996) (Document TDR/Gen/96. 1).
44 See JEAN 0. LANJOUW, THE INTRODUCTION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCT PATENTS
IN INDIA: "HEARTLESS EXPLOITATION OF THE POOR AND SUFFERING?" 24 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6366, 1998).
45 See Jeffrey Sachs, Helping the World's Poorest, ECONOMIST, Aug. 14, 1999, at 17,
20 (stating that rich countries, such as the United States, possess the technology to invent
treatments to cure diseases which primarily affect poor countries, but because it is not
economically profitable for U.S. drug companies, they will not find treatments for the
world's health problems).
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D. Negative Impacts of IPRS on Economic Development
While strengthening IPRS bears potential for enhancing growth and
development in the proper circumstances, it might also raise difficult
economic and social costs. Indeed, developing economies could experience
net welfare losses in the short run because many of the costs of protection
could emerge earlier than the dynamic benefits discussed above. This
situation explains why it is often difficult to organize interests in favor of
reform in developing countries.
In most developing economies there are significant amounts of labor
employed in copying unauthorized goods. As these nations upgrade their
laws and enforcement activities, these workers must find alternative
employment. This displacement problem should pose the initial challenge
for policymakers in introducing stronger IPRS.
Some evidence on this 4oint is available from a recent survey of the
Lebanese economy in 1996. Table 4 presents simple calculations of the
potential static employment and price impacts of stronger TPRS in several
Lebanese industries. These calculations reflect the total impacts of various
aspects of IPRS. For example, copyrights in software were assumed to
reduce piracy by 50%, which would lower infringing employment by 717
workers. However, it would shift demand toward products offered by
legitimate producers and distributors, who claimed that they did not
anticipate any rise in licensing costs from foreign software firms. As a
result, legitimate employment would go up by 426 workers, leaving a net
employment loss of 291 workers. However, workers in legitimate firms
made far higher wages on average than those involved in copying.
Moreover, interview evidence suggested that many of the skilled and
partially skilled displaced workers would find employment in the non-
infringing firms or would start their own enterprises. The analysis also
predicted a rise in software prices of 18.5% and in personal computer prices
of 17.8%. These were sizeable increases, reflecting rising markups to
legitimate producers as copyrights came to be enforced. However, they
likely would be higher in Lebanon than in many other nations because
Lebanon had a small market (preventing scale effects) and restrictive sole-
distributorship laws. Thus, the additional market power generated in
Lebanon by copyrights could be considerably stronger than might be
experienced generally.
The remaining copyright sectors may be read similarly. There would
be net employment losses in printing and publishing and in music, video,
and film as illegal copying was reduced. Book prices were predicted to rise
only by 7.3% because the legitimate publishing sector was competitive in
Lebanon. However, copyright enforcement would be expected to raise
video prices by around 10%.
46 See Maskus, Strengthening Intellectual Property Rights in Lebanon, supra note 15.
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The situation was different in food products, cosmetics, and
pharmaceuticals, which were subject both to trademark and patent
infringement. The pharmaceuticals sector, for example, was built on
copying and marketing active ingredients that could be patented elsewhere
but were not patented in Lebanon. In the analysis new patents were
assumed to raise patent licensing fees by 50% and to eliminate imports and
exports of infringing products, while trademark enforcement was assumed
to reduce counterfeiting by 50% and to raise licensing fees by 20%. These
impacts not only would reduce infringement but also would raise costs for
legitimate firms. Accordingly, employment would fall in both activities,
with a total employment loss of 550 workers and a price increase of 10%.
Employment impacts in the food products sector were bigger because it was
a larger industry, but price impacts were small because there were many
competitive firms.
Overall, these static calculations suggest that employment in IPRS-
sensitive Lebanese sectors could fall by some 5,459 workers, which was
0.5% of the formal labor force in Lebanon. In that sense the problem is
small in relation to the overall labor market. However, the adjustment
problems would be concentrated in industries and areas in which piracy was
common. Thus, there could be difficulties in finding alternative
employment or cushioning adjustment costs. In general, such costs would
be minimized in economies with flexible labor markets and rapid economic
growth, making it easier to shift workers and firms into legitimate activities.
A second major concern is the potential for IPRS to support monopoly
pricing. The provision of product patents in pharmaceuticals, agricultural
chemicals, and biotechnology, along with plant breeders' rights, should
confer greater market power on rights holders. Such firms might then
reduce sales to establish monopolistic prices in key medical therapies and
industrial and agricultural inputs. There is evidence that patents generate
considerably higher prices for protected drugs than for copied and generic
drugs.47 In 1996, Watal computed that static price impacts of patent
coverage in India could raise average patentable drug prices by perhaps
50% from a 1994 base.48
However, the extent to which such price increases would emerge
depends on several variables, such as the competitiveness of the local
pharmaceutical market, the share of drug production that is copied from
47 See Keith E. Maskus, Price Effects and Competition Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights in Developing Countries (Jan. 12, 1998) (unpublished manuscript,
background paper for The World Bank, World Development Report). Cf LANJOUW,
supra note 44, at 9 (stating that in India it is difficult to gain high prices without patent
protection, and that brand names have a market advantage).
48 See Jayashree Watal, Introducing Product Patents in the Indian Pharmaceutical
Sector - Implications for Prices and Welfare, WORLD COMPETITION: L. & ECON. REV.,
Dec. 1996, at 5, 8, 18.
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patentable drugs, and the elasticity of demand for medicines. Evidence
from India suggests that pre-patent market structures are relatively
competitive because there are significant imitative capacities. Moreover,
there could well be a significant degree of market power engendered in the
pharmaceutical industries in developing economies, after the introduction
of patents, through product differentiation and marketing. In this context, it
seems likely that the introduction of patents could place pronounced
upward pressure on patented drug prices. In one example, uncontrolled
prices of protected drugs at small pharmacies in Beijing and Shanghai may
have risen by a factor of three or four on average since the introduction of
exclusive marketing rights in 1991 and patents in 1993.
There is little empirical information available on the economic impacts
of plant breeders' rights. One recent study was performed in Argentina,
Chile, and Uruguay, which have established such systems.4 9 The study
looked only at qualitative indicators of the effects on private investments in
plant breeding, plant breeding policies of public research institutes,
international transfer of germplasm, and seed diffusion among farmers.
The systems of rights adopted have had mixed effects on these Latin
American economies. First, they have markedly improved the ability of
private breeders to control local seed markets and prevent unauthorized
trade in protected varieties. The controlled share of seed supply was above
55% in wheat and around 40% in soybeans, figures that compared
favorably with those in the United States. As a result, seed prices have
risen, though the extent of these increases was unreported. Second, these
rights have increased access to privately developed foreign seed varieties,
because their developers became more willing to market their products
there. Third, the systems retained farmers' privileges, or the right of
farmers to keep sufficient seeds from the harvest for replanting. In
consequence, farmers have not been much disadvantaged. However,
unauthorized seed dealers have seen their costs rise and some have been
pushed out of the market. Over time this rising concentration of the market
in the hands of private seed dealers could result in further price increases.
There are no systematic studies of how computer software prices vary
across countries with differing levels of copyright protection. It is often
claimed that program prices would be much higher in light of comparisons
between retail prices of legitimate and copied programs. For example, in
December 1997 it was possible in Hong Kong to purchase a pirated copy of
Microsoft Office 97 for approximately $6, while the retail price for a
legitimate copy was around $1,500. In the summer of 1998 the same
product sold for approximately $1,000 in Beijing.5° Thus, if strong
49 See UNrrED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, THE TRIPS
AGREEMENT AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES at 63-64, U.N. Doe. UNCTAD/ITE/l, U.N.
Sales No. 96.11.D.10 (1996) [hereinafter UNCTAD].
50 Field research, on file with the author.
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enforcement were to support the substantially higher price of legitimate
programs, the price impact on computer users would be severe.
However, it may be that software firms prefer to sell in countries like
Hong Kong and China at low volumes with substantial markups, reflecting
inelastic demand from corporate and government users. The markups
would accrue partially to local distributors, who may be protected also by
restrictive distributorship laws. Thus, in a dynamic sense, it is likely that as
markets develop under copyright protection, software firms would supply
more legitimate copies of programs at considerably lower prices. Indeed,
prices of copyrighted software have fallen sharply in Taiwan since the
aggressive crackdown on counterfeiting in the mid-1990s, in part because
of additional competition from local developers.
51
In summary, concerns about monopoly prices supported by IPRS
could be valid. However, if IPRS were introduced into competitive
markets, such impacts should be limited. Indeed, it makes little sense to
protect market positions both with strong IPRS and barriers to competitive
entry.
A fundamental concern raised about IPRS is that their exploitation
could result in diminished access to technological information. As
suggested above, pharmaceutical and biotechnological patents could raise
imitation costs and place considerable pressures on imitative enterprises in
developing economies. Improving trade secrets protection should make it
more difficult to acquire technologies through misappropriation. Copyright
protection would make it more difficult to copy computer software.
Such potential costs explain the reluctance of many developing
economies to strengthen their regimes. However, they must be placed into
broader perspective. First, these costs would be counterbalanced by greater
incentives for technology transfer through trade, FDI, and licensing as
discussed earlier. Indeed, it is likely that many local pharmaceutical firms
would find it advantageous to reach production and technology-sharing
agreements with international enterprises. Second, stronger IPRS would
improve prospects for innovative enterprises in developing nations to enter
markets and develop new products. Third, rising imitation costs need not
be damaging if IPRS are introduced into a competitive economy in which
firms have the ability to choose among many potential suppliers of
technology and products.
A paramount worry for developing countries is that protection for
intellectual property could result in higher costs for the use of new
technologies, with the bulk of those costs being transferred to foreign patent
owners as economic rents (profits). Interesting evidence of this possibility
is provided in the first column of Table 1. These figures update the results
51 Interviews conducted in Taipei (December 1997) (transcript on file with the
author).
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of McCalman,52 who in 1999 estimated the impacts of stronger patent rights
required in TRIPS on the value of patents in place in 1988. Firms own
patent portfolios in various countries, the values of which depend on the
strength of local protection. McCalman worked out the required changes in
patent laws, as measured by the index developed by Ginarte and Park53 in
1997 for 29 countries, some of which appear in the table. He applied these
changes to 1988 international patent portfolios owned by each country in
order to investigate the implied changes in rents if the stronger laws had
been in place. Thus, the analysis held patenting constant at its pre-TRIPS
level and did not account for any induced changes in innovation. The
effects on rent transfers depended on patent stocks in place and the extent
of the legal changes required.
I have updated his calculations to millions of 1995 dollars through the
use of national GDP deflators and exchange rates. While this increased the
magnitudes somewhat it did not affect the central message.
Overwhelmingly the United States would gain the most income in terms of
static rent transfers, with a net inflow of some $5.8 billion per year. This
reflected the fact that U.S.-headquartered firms owned numerous patents in
many countries that were required by TRIPS to upgrade their intellectual
property protection, while U.S. law was subject to virtually no change.
Germany would earn an additional net income of $997 million on its patent
portfolio. Most countries would experience a rising net outflow of patent
rents, both because of significant changes in their laws and because they
tended to be net technology importers. The largest net outward transfer of
some $1.3 billion accrued to Canada, in which many U.S.-owned patents
would receive stronger protection. Developing countries also would pay
more on their patent stocks, with Brazil experiencing a net outward transfer
of around $1.2 billion per year.
These calculations are inherently zero-sum and static. They ask solely
what the additional income on existing patents would have been under
TRIPS.5 4 In that sense, one might characterize TRIPS as an outstanding
example of "strategic trade policy" on behalf of the United States, though it
is equally possible to characterize weak IPRs as a mechanism employed by
other governments for appropriating rents from American inventors. The
figures are interesting because they suggest that TRIPS could have a
significant impact on net incomes earned from foreign patents. To put the
52 See Phillip McCalman, Reaping What You Sow: An Empirical Analysis of
International Patent Harmonization (1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Wisconsin (Madison)) (on file with the author).
53 See Ginarte & Park, supra note 3, at 285-86.
54 In principle the column should sum to zero but it does not because of the updating
and the exclusion of some countries.
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result in perspective, net royalties and licensee fees earned by U.S.-resident
firms amounted to $20.9 billion in 1995. 55
Finally, it should be noted that costs of administration and enforcement
could be burdensome as developing economies implement stronger IPRS
systems. In 1996, UNCTAD provided some rough estimates of the
administrative costs of complying with TRIPS in various developing
countries.56 In Chile, additional fixed costs from this upgrade were
estimated at $718,000 and annual recurrent costs at $837,000.57  An
Egyptian expert thought the fixed costs would be perhaps $800,000, with
additional annual training costs of around $1 million.58 Bangladesh
anticipated one-time costs of administrative TRIPS compliance (drafting
legislation) amounting to $250,000 and over $1.1 million in annual costs
for judicial work, equipment, and enforcement efforts. 59 These estimates do
not include training costs. 60 Note that Egypt and Bangladesh have extreme
scarcities of trained professional administrators and judges, suggesting that
these estimated costs could be low. In an economic sense, one of the
largest costs of implementing an effective administrative system is that it
would divert scarce professional and technical resources into such
administration and out of other productive activities.
The existence of considerable fixed costs means that small and poor
countries are unlikely to develop a significant commitment to adequate
institutional reform. Countering this problem are three factors. First,
intellectual property offices may charge fees for examination and
registration procedures to defray their costs. Second, poor countries may
petition for technical and financial assistance from industrial countries and
WIPO and the WTO to help absorb the fixed costs of implementing new
administrative and enforcement procedures. Third, developing country
authorities may avail themselves of cooperative international agreements to
help cut their costs. Membership in the Patent Cooperation Treaty, for
example, provides significant economies because examiners may read the
opinions made by major patent offices about novelty and industrial
applicability, rather than undertake such technical examinations themselves.
E. Evidence on the Overall Impact of IPRS on Growth
The analysis reviewed here claims that strengthening IPRS systems
could raise or lower economic growth, though the relationships would be
55 See 48 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, BALANCE OF PAYMENTS STATISTICS
YEARBOOK, PART 1: COUNTRY TABLES 848 (1997).
56 See UNCTAD, supra note 49, at 23-26.
57 See id. at 23.
58 See id. at 23-24.
59 See id. at 25.
60 See id.
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complex and dependent on circumstances. Two recent studies have
considered this question empirically. First, Gould and Gruben related
economic growth rates across many countries to a simple index of patent
strength and other variables. 61 They found no strong direct effects of
patents on growth, but there was a significantly positive impact when
patents were interacted with a measure of openness to trade.62 That is, the
impact of stronger patents in open economies was to raise growth rates by
0.66% on average, suggesting that market liberalization in combination
with stronger IPRS increases growth.63
Their argument was that open economies tend to experience greater
competition, higher amounts of competitive FDI, and enhanced needs to
acquire advanced technologies for purposes of raising product quality.
Moreover, firms in such countries would be more likely to undertake the
costs of effective technology transfer and adaptation to local circumstances.
However, such innovation would be more prevalent in economies with
adequate IPRS. This finding implies that as countries strengthen their IPRs,
pursuing market liberalization would procure a more affirmative path to
economic growth.
In 1997, Park and Ginarte studied how IPRs affect growth and
investment. They found no direct correlation between patent strength and
growth, but there was a strong and positive impact of patents on physical
investment and R&D spending, which in turn raised growth performance. 64
This result was consistent with that in Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee,
who found that FDI had a significantly positive impact on growth, but only
in countries that had attained a threshold level of secondary education
within their populations. 65 In this sense, IPRs, openness, FDI, and human
capital accumulation work jointly in raising productivity and growth.
ITI. BENEFITING FROM INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
The adoption of stronger IPRS in developing countries is often
defended by claims that this reform will attract significant new inward
flows of technology, a blossoming of local innovation and cultural
industries, and a faster closing of the technology gap between themselves
and developed countries. It must be recognized, however, that improved
IPRS by themselves are highly unlikely to produce such benefits. Consider
61 See David M. Gould & William C. Gruben, The Role of Intellectual Property
Rights in Economic Growth, 48 J. DEv. ECON. 323, 334-35 (1996).
62 See id. at 324.
63 See id. at 341.
64 Cf. Ginarte & Park, supra note 3, at 298 (discussing the correlation among patent
rights, R&D spending, and openness to foreign trade).
65 See E. Borensztein et al., How Does Foreign Direct Investment Affect Economic
Growth?, 45 J. INT'L ECON. 115, 127 (1998).
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the differences between countries in sub-Saharan Africa, with longstanding
and relatively strong laws on the books (albeit a limited ability to enforce
them), and countries in East Asia, many of which have reformed their
regimes only quite recently. The prior group attracts little FDI and receives
few patents at home or abroad. The latter group attracts the bulk of FDI in
the developing world and is experiencing rising use of intellectual property
66protection. Expectations that stronger IPRS alone will bring technical
change and growth are likely to be frustrated.
The evidence presented above suggested that IPRS could generate
more international economic activity and greater indigenous innovation, but
such effects would be conditional on circumstances. Circumstances vary
widely across countries and the positive impacts of IPRS should be stronger
in countries with appropriate complementary endowments and policies.
Countries face the challenge of ensuring that their new policy regimes
become pro-active mechanisms for promoting beneficial technical change,
innovation, and consumer gains.
A. Implementing Procompetitive IPRS Standards
Developing nations are overwhelmingly importers of technology,
suggesting that they should establish standards that encourage learning and
follow-on innovation within their IPRS system. For example, patent
examiners could follow the highest reasonable standards for non-
obviousness in invention patents, require early disclosure of technological
information, limit protection to narrow patent claims, and establish a
narrow doctrine of equivalents. The last approach, exemplified by an
effective system of utility models, could be significant for encouraging the
development of local capacity to invent legitimately around patents. An
effective system of opposition to patent grants is important for interested
parties to make available information about prior art.
The construction of particular standards requires careful thought. For
example, TRIPS requires patents for biotechnological microorganisms and
special protection for plant varieties. However, there is room to vary from
U.S. standards in this regard. It is possible to erect strict standards of
novelty, non-obviousness, and disclosure in biotechnology in order to
promote dissemination and limit broad protection. However, the stricter are
these standards the more they discourage fundamental invention by the
emerging local biotechnology industries. In protecting plant varieties it is
advisable to provide a breeders' exemption, a farmers' privilege, and
mechanisms for conserving biodiversity. Again, however, such limitations
may deter exploitation of plant rights by foreign enterprises and discourage
invention in agricultural public research institutes. Regarding the latter, it
66 See Keith E. Maskus, Strengthening Intellectual Property Rights in Asia:
Implications for Australia, 37 AusTL. ECON. PAPERS 346, 346-51, 354-57 (1998);
Maskus, Foreign Direct Investment, supra note 1, at 128-29.
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is important to ensure that mechanisms for moving research results from the
laboratory to farmers' use are transparent and efficient.
In copyrights, countries could allow wide exceptions to protection
under the fair-use doctrine for research and educational purposes.
Particularly significant would be a liberal stance on reverse engineering of
computer programs, with the intent of encouraging indigenous software
development. Thus, while wholesale copying must be prohibited,
developers could use functional components of protected programs in
independently developed programs. The extension of patents to computer
programs is of dubious value in development terms and is not required by
international norms.
B. Enhance Capacities to Develop and Use IPRS
The dynamic benefits countries accrue from IPRS depend on their
abilities to develop and absorb technologies and new products. In this
context, three issues are critical for development purposes. First, it is clear
that the ability to adapt new technologies to local industrial uses is
improved by strong levels of educational attainment and sizeable
endowments of human capital. 67 Thus, there are important payoffs to
providing access to technical training and secondary or university
education.
Second, productivity in absorbing foreign technologies depends
critically on the R&D performance of local enterprises.68 This observation
points to the importance of developing an effective technology policy for
promoting technical change in domestic enterprises. Such programs could
include technology demonstration projects, information sharing through
conferences, the encouragement of research joint ventures, and improved
linkages between public research institutes and enterprises. Indeed, an
important problem in many countries is the inability of research institutes to
bring their inventions to market in a useful way, in part because property
rights to those inventions are unclear. Stronger IPRS alone would help in
this context, but so also would development contracts between institutes
and enterprises with defined ownership shares and increased flexibility for
researchers to form new business concerns.
Third, it is also important for countries to encourage the development
of financial markets that are capable of managing the significant risks
involved in technology development. Nations could learn from the
experience of American venture capital firms.
67 See Coe et al., supra note 22, at 137.
68 See Sean M. Dougherty, The Role of Foreign Technology in Improving Chinese
Productivity 13 (1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
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C. Promote Competitive Markets
Ultimately, perhaps the most important determinant of the success of
an IPRS regime is the competitive nature of the markets within which it
operates. Put briefly, the dynamic gains from IPRS are larger, and the costs
of abuse are smaller, in economies with competitive market structures.
Thus, it is important for countries to liberalize their markets to the deepest
extent possible as they strengthen their protective systems. This
observation calls for further opening to international trade and investment,
including relaxing restrictions against service providers. Domestic
deregulation initiatives to make enterprises more competitive are also
important here. Such reform needs to be accompanied by mechanisms to
ensure that potential entry of new firms is not blocked by public
regulations.
Evidence mentioned above showed that economies that are more open
to trade and FDI should experience a growth premium from strengthening
their IPRS in comparison with closed economies. Stronger property rights
create market power, which is more easily abused in economies that are
closed to foreign competition. An important impact of trade liberalization
is to inject foreign goods and techniques, which compete with previously
protected oligopolies. These pro-competitive gains have been shown to be
significant in a variety of contexts and at different levels of development.
69
In that regard, to strengthen IPRS, on the one hand, but to maintain closed
markets, on the other hand, is to work at cross-purposes. For example, a
patent takes on greater market power in the presence of an import quota on
similar goods, which limits consumer substitution choices. Competitive
markets help limit the effective scope of intellectual property rights to their
intended function, which is to foster investments in competition but not to
prevent fair entry.
There are additional reasons why IPRs and open markets are
complementary policies. First, a liberal stance on inward trade and FDI
improves a country's access to available international technologies,
intermediate inputs, and producer services, all items that can raise domestic
productivity. However, the evidence above demonstrated that such flows
are discouraged by weak patent rights and trade secrets. Second, a critical
purpose of IPRS is to encourage investments in improved product quality,
which is often a pre-condition for breaking into export markets. Similarly,
IPRS can support investments in marketing that raise product demand and
69 See Richard Harris, Applied General Equilibrium Analysis of Small Open
Economies with Scale Economies and Imperfect Competition, 74 AM. ECON. REV.
1016,1030-31 (1984) (discussing the welfare gains of trade liberalization in small open
economies. See generally, e.g., Dani Rodrik, Imperfect Competition, Scale Economies,
and Trade Policy in Developing Countries, in TRADE POLICY ISSUE AND EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS 109 (Robert E. Baldwin, ed., 1988) (analyzing domestic market structures and
the benefits of trade liberalization to developing countries).
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permit economies of scale in production. These processes pertain as much
to domestic entrepreneurs as they do to incoming foreign competitors.
D. Develop Competition Policies
Because intellectual property rights create market power, their use is
potentially subject to anticompetitive abuses. Such concerns are often
overstated. Intellectual property rights define the boundaries within which
an inventor or creator has exclusive use rights. Such rights rarely create
strong monopoly positions unless they are combined with restrictions on
competitive entry by other firms. Indeed, IPRS are critical for promoting
R&D that generates dynamic competition.
Nonetheless, the scope of IPRS is limited in order to promote access,
dissemination, and competition. Attempts by rights holders to extend their
use of IPRS beyond permitted limits are abuses of the competitive system.
It is useful to review the forms in which such abuse may occur. For
example, monopoly pricing represents one potential abuse, although in
competitive markets there are usually market substitutes that discipline the
ability of IPRS to support monopoly prices. Therefore, pricing decisions
are rarely regulated by public authorities in industrial countries except for
purposes of limiting the costs of maintaining public health and nutrition.
Perceived abuses of IPRS typically relate to strategic business
decisions, including selling practices and licensing restrictions. There is a
large literature on the competitive effects of market power created by
patents, trademarks, and protected know-how. 70 There are few concrete
guidelines in the area because of the complex nature of markets for
information and technology. Vertical licensing agreements, for example,
could serve the purpose of ensuring downstream product quality, which
improves competition. However, tie-in sales of unrelated products to
technology purchasers may represent an attempt to extend the scope of a
property right, which damages competition.
Potential competitive problems raised by the exploitation of IPRS
include the following. First, horizontal cartels of competing firms may
occur through licensing agreements that fix prices, limit output, or divide
markets. Actual and potential competitors could be both licensees and
licensors, either in the market for the product or technology itself or in
extended markets. For example, patent-pooling and cross-licensing
agreements between competing licensors may reduce competition in
downstream product markets that use the licensed technologies as key
70 See generally Organisation for Economic Co-operation [OECD], Competition
Policy and Intellectual Property Rights (1989) (providing a review of competition
policies relating to patents and licensing agreement by examining case law, statutes and
regulations of OECD nations). See generally UNCTAD, supra note 49 (reviewing the
economic and legal implications faced by developing countries under the TRIPS
Agreement).
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inputs, particularly where the agreements set prices or restrict territories,
customers, and fields of use.
In industrial countries competition authorities have found it difficult to
set general rules covering such licensing contracts. Instead, investigations
are undertaken to determine whether an agreement presents the potential for
cartelization of a significant share of a particular market. Concerns also
arise over agreements requiring resale price maintenance of distributors'
prices, which could result in vertical price-fixing unrelated to the need to
monitor and enforce quality assurance. Clearly such risks are greater the
more regulated is entry into distribution contracts, a common problem in
developing countries.
Second, licensing agreements for intellectual property could
anticompetitively exclude rival firms from competing in particular markets
by raising barriers to entry. This could be the case with tie-in sales, in
which a licensor gains a dominant position for the tied good. Potential
competitors would be forced to enter in both the markets for the protected
technology and the tied good, raising costs. Similar problems exist if
licensees are required only to use the licensor's technology, which may also
require use of future technologies. Such restrictions could result in a
dominant position for licensors in secondary markets and limit competitive
entry by rival firms. A related difficulty arises when licensors block the
development of competing new technologies through exclusive grant-back
provisions and exclusivity arrangements in future technology purchases.
Competition policy must try to assess the potential anticompetitive impacts
of licensing arrangements before deciding whether and how to regulate
them. Note that such impacts depend crucially on the structure of the
markets in which licensing contracts operate, the share of markets they
cover, and the difficulty of entry for rival enterprises.
A third general class of problems relates to attempts to acquire
excessive market power by purchasing exclusive rights to competing
technologies and products, with the intention of preventing their
commercial use. Such efforts effectively are horizontal mergers, which
must be analyzed in terms of their impact on market concentration. A final
problem is non-price predation, in which IPRS may be used to bring bad-
faith litigation and opposition proceedings in order to exclude and harass
competitors. This may be particularly damaging in cases where potential
rivals are small and new and therefore lack the resources needed to defend
themselves in court. In turn, this problem could stifle the development and
introduction of competing technologies and products. The task for
competition authorities is to distinguish predatory behavior from legitimate
enforcement of IRPS. For example, firms may refuse to license
technologies in particular markets or to particular firms, which could be
interpreted either as legitimate business practice or unfair competition.
The message is that there are complex relationships between IPRS and
their potential abuse. Property rights support market power, the exercise of
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which does not necessarily constitute an abuse. Competition policy makers
need to distinguish various forms of behavior in terms of potential impacts
on competition and consumer welfare. In this view, it is likely advisable
for countries developing competition rules to follow some form of the
American "rule of reason" approach, rather than attempting to codify rules
covering specific actions, which is the EU approach. More specifically, a
rule of per se illegality might apply to attempts to monopolize horizontal
production and distribution channels, while the rule-of-reason standard
might apply to vertical arrangements and tied sales. Patent licensing and
pooling arrangements, while not necessarily anticompetitive, might warrant
some scrutiny. Note further that the TRIPS agreement permits use of non-
exclusive compulsory licenses under prescribed circumstances to overcome
abusive practices, so long as adequate compensation is paid.
Thus, there is scope for nations to promote competition in the
operation of patent and trademark licensing. In this context, however, note
that many foreign enterprises remain frustrated by the intrusive examination
procedures employed by licensing authorities in approving technology
contracts.7 ' Thus, some balance must be struck between encouraging
competition and discouraging entry.
Countries must also consider their position on the exhaustion of IPRS.
Countries generally observe a "first-sale doctrine" under which domestic
sale of a protected good eliminates rights to prevent its further sale, which
helps promote competition. The issue is more controversial internationally,
where recognizing exhaustion implies allowing parallel imports or exports
of protected goods. There are again complicated tradeoffs here. Generally
an exhaustion principle promotes market integration and disciplines
monopoly pricing, suggesting that it is procompetitive. However, poor
countries may benefit from market segmentation if it encourages foreign
firms to sell their goods at lower prices than in rich countries. Until further
information is developed on this score, governments might be advised to
pursue a policy of international exhaustion.
Finally, public-health authorities might follow the lead of many
developed economies in establishing a regime of price regulation in
patented pharmaceuticals for purposes of limiting prices paid by patients
and hospitals and restraining the costs of public provision of health care.
Evidence shows that such regulation significantly restrains prices but also
discourages pharmaceutical innovation in countries that follow them, so
again a balance between objectives needs to be struck.7 2
71 See China Survey, supra note 17, at 20.
72 See PATRICIA M. DANZON, PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE REGULATION: NATIONAL
POLICIES VERSUS GLOBAL INTERESTS 4 (1997).
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
Economic theory demonstrates that IPRS could play either a positive
or negative role in fostering growth and development. The limited evidence
available suggests that the relationship is positive but dependent on other
factors that help promote benefits from intellectual property protection. In
brief, IPRS could be effective and market-based mechanisms for
overcoming problems that exist in markets for information creation and
dissemination. However, their existence could pose problems in terms of
their potential for costs and anticompetitive abuse.
Accordingly, modem IPRS systems are not sufficient by themselves to
encourage effective technology transition. Instead, they must form part of a
coherent and broad set of complementary policies that maximize the
potential for IPRS to raise dynamic competition. Such policies include
strengthening human capital and skill acquisition, promoting flexibility in
enterprise organization, ensuring a strong degree of competition on
domestic markets, and developing a transparent, non-discriminatory, and
effective competition regime.
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Table 1. Estimates of Impacts of TRIPS Patent Changes on
International Flows of Economic Activity for Selected Countries
(millions of 1995 dollars)
Net
Patent
Country Rentsa
USA 5760
Germany 997
Switzerland 28
Australia -28
Ireland -61
New Zealand -68
Portugal -110
Greece -149
Netherlands -222
Spain -436
Japan -555
UK -684
Canada -1294
Panama 0.4
Israel -83
Colombia -97
South Africa -143
Rep. of Korea -326
Mexico -562
India -665
Brazil -1172
Argentina na
Bangladesh na
Chile na
China na
Indonesia na
Mfg.
Imports
233
2304
35
102
100
45
605
382
133
2070
918
272
754
16
30
2927
154
2732
5749
1465
3125
1150
130
2017
15379
6628
High-Tech
Mfg.
Imports
b
-3
-18
-1
-2
-2
-1
95
53
-3
319
-21
-5
-12
na
5
479
21
588
1519
146
627
196
14
276
2585
667
FDI
Assetsc
na
-1084
-94
-256
-245
-76
89
47
-1380
-313
-2326
-1257
-2188
284
6
1093
23
248
3182
128
3219
662
na
975
631
1805
Unaffiliated
Royalties &
License Feesd
na
92
0
2
13
4
na
na
29
43
719
26
63
na
0.6
na
10
356
136
58
114
59
na
na
na
166
Reprinted with permission from Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual
Property Issues for the New Round, in THE WTO AFTER SEATTLE (Jeffrey
J. Schott ed. 2000).
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Table 2. Percentage of Firms Claiming that the Strength or
Weakness of Intellectual Property Rights Has a Strong Effect on
Whether Direct Investments Will Be Made, by Type of Facility,
1991
Sales Basic Components Complete R&D Average
Sector and Production Manufacture Products Facilities
Distribution and Manufacture
Assembly
Chemicals 19 46 71 87 100 65
Transport
Equipment 17 17 33 33 80 36
Electrical
Equipment 15 40 57 74 80 53
Food
Products 29 29 25 43 60 37
Metals 20 40 50 50 80 48
Machinery 23 23 50 65 77 48
Average 20 32 48 59 80 48
Source: Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign
Direct Investment, and Technology Transfer, World Bank Discussion paper
No. 19 (1994).
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Table 3. Percentage of Firms Claiming that Intellectual
Property Protection Is Too Weak to Permit Types of
Investment, 1991
Country Chemicals Transport Electrical Food Metals Machinery Average
Equip. Equip.
Panel A: Joint Ventures with Local Partners
Argentina 40 0 29 12 0 27 18
Brazil 47 40 31 12 0 65 32
India 80 40 39 38 20 48 44
Indonesia 50 40 29 25 0 25 28
Mexico 47 20 30 25 0 17 22
Korea 33 20 21 12 25 26 23
Thailand 43 80 32 12 0 20 31
Average 49 34 30 19 6 33
Panel B: Transfer of Newest or Most Effective Technology to Wholly Owned
Subsidiaries
Argentina 44 20 21 12 0 14 18
Brazil 50 40 24 12 0 39 28
India 81 40 38 38 20 41 43
Indonesia 40 20 31 25 0 23 23
Mexico 31 20 21 25 0 22 20
Korea 31 20 28 12 40 22 26
Thailand 60 80 31 12 0 18 20
Average 48 34 28 19 9 26
Panel C: Licensing of Newest or Most Effective Technology to Unrelated Firms
Argentina 62 0 26 12 0 29 22
Brazil 69 40 29 25 0 73 39
India 81 40 38 38 20 50 44
Indonesia 73 20 33 25 0 37 31
Mexico 56 20 28 25 0 36 28
Korea 38 20 34 12 40 29 29
Thailand 73 80 36 12 0 25 38
Averagea 65 31 32 21 9 40
Source: Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign
Direct Investment, and Technology Transfer, World Bank Discussion paper
No. 19 (1994). Note: aAverage over the seven countries listed.
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Table 4. Simulated Static Effects of Stronger IPRS Enforcement
in Lebanon, 1996
Infringing Legitimate Net Weighted
Sector Employment Employment Employment Price (%)
Software -717 +426 -291
Software +18.5
Personal Computers +17.8
Printing & Publishing -642 +298 -343
Printing Services +13.2
Books, etc. +7.3
Music, Video, & Film -500 +119 -381
Music & Video +10.1
Film +2.3
Food Products -2681 -479 -3160 +3.8
Cosmetics -614 -119 -733 +4.3
Pharmaceuticals -315 -235 -550 +10.0
TOTALS -5469 +10 -5459 na
Source: Keith E. Maskus, Strengthening Intellectual Property Rights
in Lebanon, in CATCHING UP WITH THE COMPETITION (Bernard Hoekman
& Jamel E. Zarrouk, eds., forthcoming 2000).
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